Bismarck's War: The Franco-Prussian War and the Making of Modern Europe

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Hof- und Staatshandbuch des Herzogtums Braunschweig für das Jahr 1897, Braunschweig: Meyer, 1897, p.10 Roskill, Stephen (1954). The War at Sea 1939–1945. History of the Second World War. Vol.I: The Defensive. Edited by J. R. M. Butler. London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630188-8. Wawro, Geoffrey (2005). The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-61743-7.

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Sheehan, James J. (1978). German liberalism in the ninetury century. University of Chicago Press; ACLS. hdl: 2027/heb.01317.0001.001. ISBN 9780226752082. The Germans also had an unexpected advantage in that Napoleon III was in constant pain from gallstones which, combined with the side-effects of the opium prescribed by his doctors, made him incapable of exercising effective command. As a result, there was no one able to impose a clear overall strategy on the quarrelling French generals. Egerton, George W. (1994). Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory. Psychology Press. p.14. ISBN 978-0-7146-3471-5. Archived from the original on 4 October 2015 . Retrieved 11 August 2015.

Bismarck: Why Was The WW2 German Battleship So Feared Bismarck: Why Was The WW2 German Battleship So Feared

Kennedy, Paul M. (1988). The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914. Humanity Books. ISBN 1-57392-301-X. Although the six-month Franco-Prussian War was among the shortest of all major European conflicts, it brought Dietrich and his comrades sights that robbed them of any temptation to triumphalism. The war’s combination of lethal new weapons (breechloading rifles, machine guns, steel cannon) and huge armies left mountains of dead and hordes of permanently mutilated wounded: In the murderous engagement at Gravelotte in August 1870, the Prussians lost twice as many men as they had during the entire Austro-Prussian War of 1866.Steenson, Gary P. (1981) 'Not One Man, Not One Penny': German Social Democracy, 1863–1914 Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 228–29. ISBN 0-8229-5329-3

German battleship Bismarck - Wikipedia

Wetzel, David (2012). A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870–1871. University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-29134-1. Robinson, Janet; Robinson, Joe (2009). Handbook of Imperial Germany. AuthorHouse. ISBN 978-1-4490-2113-9. Gatacre, G.G.O. (1982). A Naval Career: Reports of Proceedings 1921–1964. Sydney: Nautical Press & Publications. ISBN 0-949756-02-4. The efficient German mobilisation, which succeeded in moving 384,000 men with their horses and artillery to their assembly areas within two weeks, is contrasted with the chaotic French system, which left tens of thousands of reservists scattered across France vainly trying to reach their units. Moltke had a two-to-one overall numerical superiority, but at key points his forces outnumbered Napoleon’s armies by an overwhelming four to one. Hof- und Staats-Handbuch des Königreichs Bayern (in German). Munich: Königl. Oberpostamt. 1867. p.11. Archived from the original on 12 July 2021 . Retrieved 15 July 2019.

Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach: Grand Cross of the White Falcon, 3 September 1866; [179] in Brilliants, 1885 [180]