The Eastern Fleet and the Indian Ocean, 1942-1944: The Fleet that Had to Hide

Product Information

After the departure of the main battle forces during February 1942, the Indian Ocean was left with mostly escort carriers and older battleships as the core of its naval forces. Allied advances in the Mediterranean and northern Europe during 1943 and 1944, however, released naval resources. As a result, more British aircraft carriers entered the area; plus the battlecruiser HMS Renown, the battleships Howe, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and supporting warships. Preparations were put in hand for a more aggressive stance in the Indian Ocean and for British naval participation in the Pacific theatre. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King USN, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm (FAA) aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March, 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers (escorted by HNLMS Tromp) and practice refuelling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with United States Navy Task Force 58.5, the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers. [17] Somerville was in a bad tactical position. The fast division (Force A) was refueling and the slow division (Force B) was scattered— Hermes at Ceylon with two cruisers, the battleships at Addu Atoll. Nagumo’s task force was a veteran outfit, and its pilots had scored victories at Pearl Harbor, Wake, Darwin, and the Dutch East Indies. Against this the British had to send in a second-string team. On paper, the British Eastern Fleet was a tough outfit: three carriers, five battleships, seven cruisers, and 14 destroyers, based out of Ceylon. Closer inspection showed serious flaws in the fleet.

India, however, sees things differently. From an Indian vantage point, the convention cannot be interpreted to permit military activities in other nations’ exclusive economic zones. When it ratified the convention in 1995, New Delhi clarified its position in a declaration stating that in its understanding, the convention does not “authorize other states to carry out in the EEZ [exclusive economic zone] and on the continental shelf military exercises or maneuvers, in particular those including the use of weapons or explosions, without the consent of the coastal state.” This position is consistent with India’s domestic laws, the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act of 1976 , and remains unchanged.

Choose Display Mode

Watson, Graham (19 September 2015). "Royal Navy Organisation in World War 2, 1939–1945: 3.3 Indian and Pacific Oceans". naval-history.net. Gordon Smith . Retrieved 10 July 2018. Following their victory at Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy's First Air Fleet moved through the American, Dutch and British colonies of South and East Asia. Having taken the mighty British naval base at Singapore, the next move was to enter the Indian Ocean and challenge the Royal Navy there. On May 15–16, 1945, the British carriied out Operation Dukedom; the 26th Destroyer Flotilla ( HMS Saumarez, Venus, Verulam, Vigilant and Virago) sank the Japanese heavy cruiser Haguro in the Malacca Straits using torpedos. [18] Postwar [ ] Nagumo disengaged after recovering the strike on Hermes. [46] Aftermath [ edit ] British reaction [ edit ] Fuchida’s assessment of the one-sided engagement was harsh: “The surface vessels did not have a chance against our striking force. It was like turning a hand, it was so easy.”

a b c Hobbs, David (2013). British Aircraft Carriers. Seaforth Publishing. Chapter 7: Hermes. ISBN 978-1-84832-138-0. (ebook)

Customer reviews

Stuart, Rob (2006). "Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo". Canadian Military Journal. Department of National Defence of Canada. 7 (4) . Retrieved 4 January 2021. Parshall, Jonathan & Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0. The Japanese inflicted disproportionate damage on the enemy. They damaged port facilities, sank one carrier and two cruisers, destroyed a third of enemy ground-based fighters and nearly all of the enemy ground-based strike aircraft. In addition, 23 merchant ships, [41] totalling 112,312 tons, [43] were sunk, including those by the separate Japanese Malay Force. In return, the Japanese lost only 18 aircraft, with damage to about 31 more. Conversely, they failed to destroy, or even locate, the main bulk of the British Eastern Fleet. [41]

Roskill, Stephen (1956). War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, the Period of Balance. United Kingdom Military Series. London: HMSO . Retrieved 2 September 2015.Somerville knew he could not fight the Japanese in daylight, so he turned south to avoid the enemy. For the next few hours, Somerville played hide-and-seek with the Japanese, struggling to avoid their reconnaissance planes. He worried that the Japanese might learn the location of his secret base at Addu Atoll. Grove, Eric (1987). Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-0870215520. The Japanese force, commanded by Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, had a core of five aircraft carriers; Akagi, Shōkaku and Zuikaku in Carrier Division 5, and Sōryū and Hiryū in Carrier Division 2. [1] The carriers were accompanied by all four Kongo-class battleships, and both Tone-class cruisers. [7] In a welter of explosions and screeching dive bombers, the Japanese scored hits on the British harbor buildings and other shore installations. They also hit the monitor Erebus and the merchant ship Sagaing, 7,958 tons.